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Abstract
There is mounting concern about the negative animal health and supply chain consequences of animal disease
outbreaks in the United States. Recent disease outbreaks have drawn attention to the need for additional
understanding of biosecurity efforts to reduce disease frequency, spread, and impact. Biosecurity is a key
component of the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan designed to provide business continuity in the event of a
foreign animal disease outbreak as well as help protect operations from endemic diseases. Core biosecurity
recommendations outlined in the SPS Plan are a written site-specific biosecurity plan and implementation of a
perimeter buffer area and a line of separation. To-date, no benchmarking of SPS Plan biosecurity
implementation has been done. Utilizing data from a 2017 survey of U.S. swine producers, this study shows
that SPS Plan biosecurity adoption varies and is affected by how feasible producers believe implementation of
each biosecurity practice is on their operation. Furthermore, binomial logit regression analyses indicate
producer and operation demographics and producer risk attitudes and perceptions affect biosecurity
adoption. Conditional probabilities reveal that adoption of biosecurity practices is overwhelmingly
complementary, suggesting that one biosecurity practice likely increases marginal efficacy of another
biosecurity practice. The insights this study provides regarding the complexities of biosecurity adoption are
vitally important to both educators and policy makers.
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There is mounting concern about the negative animal health and supply chain
consequences of animal disease outbreaks in the United States. Recent disease
outbreaks have drawn attention to the need for additional understanding of biosecurity
efforts to reduce disease frequency, spread, and impact. Biosecurity is a key component
of the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan designed to provide business continuity in the event
of a foreign animal disease outbreak as well as help protect operations from endemic
diseases. Core biosecurity recommendations outlined in the SPS Plan are a written site-
specific biosecurity plan and implementation of a perimeter buffer area and a line of
separation. To-date, no benchmarking of SPS Plan biosecurity implementation has been
done. Utilizing data from a 2017 survey of U.S. swine producers, this study shows that
SPS Plan biosecurity adoption varies and is affected by how feasible producers believe
implementation of each biosecurity practice is on their operation. Furthermore, binomial
logit regression analyses indicate producer and operation demographics and producer
risk attitudes and perceptions affect biosecurity adoption. Conditional probabilities reveal
that adoption of biosecurity practices is overwhelmingly complementary, suggesting that
one biosecurity practice likely increases marginal efficacy of another biosecurity practice.
The insights this study provides regarding the complexities of biosecurity adoption are
vitally important to both educators and policy makers.
Keywords: animal health economics, biosecurity adoption, foreign animal diseases, Secure Pork Supply Plan, pig,
swine
INTRODUCTION
African swine fever (ASF), classical swine fever (CSF), and foot and mouth disease (FMD) are
highly contagious transboundary animal diseases. An outbreak of one of these diseases in a country
poses a severe threat to animal health and animal agriculture and would have significant economic
consequences. Because of their potential for serious and rapid spread irrespective of borders and
their ability to cause serious economic consequences and impact trade of animals and animal
products, these foreign animal diseases (FADs) are reportable to and monitored by the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE). The United States has maintained ASF-, CSF-, and FMD-
free status, but with these diseases present in many other countries, including the unsettling
recent global ASF developments, the risk of introduction and spread is at the height of U.S. fears,
considerations, and planning.
If ASF, CSF, or FMD were confirmed in the United States, response strategies for controlling
and stopping the spread of these animal diseases would likely be far-reaching. It is reasonably
Pudenz et al. Swine Producer Biosecurity Adoption
certain that as a result of an outbreak of one of these diseases
all movement of animals from affected industries would come
to a complete halt, as would U.S. meat exports. Depending on
the severity of the outbreak and the method used to contain
the disease, some markets could remain closed for an extended
period of time.
The Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan provides opportunities
for pork producers through premise identification, enhanced
biosecurity implementation, surveillance and sample collection,
and movement monitoring to voluntarily prepare before a
FAD outbreak. Having the SPS Plan implemented prior to
an FAD outbreak is intended to enhance coordination and
communication between all stakeholders, speed up a successful
FAD response, and eventually enable the issuance of animal
movement permits after the extent of the outbreak is understood.
Collectively, this should help support continuity of business for
participating producers and allied industries1.
In order for the SPS Plan to effectively meet the goals it has
set forth, a minimum level of participation is necessary, and
the full benefits of the plan are likely only realized with a high
level of participation. To date, no benchmarking of SPS Plan
implementation has been done. This highlights a critical need
that we aim to meet in this study by identifying and explaining
producer implementation of SPS Plan components, namely
enhanced biosecurity adoption. Understanding adoption, or lack
thereof, is important for improving program targeting and policy
deliberations as well as for increasing voluntary participation.
BACKGROUND AND WORK NEEDED
The United States is a significant producer and consumer of pork
and pork products, and any event that would interrupt exports,
imports, or movement of animals within the country would
have serious economic consequences. In 2017, the United States
was the world’s second-largest exporter of pork and pork
products, with exports averaging 22% of domestic commercial
pork production (1). Live imports into the United States are
important to the domestic swine industry, with imports of all
hogs and pigs into the United States during 2017 totaling 5.6
million head (2). Specifically, feeder pig imports from Canada
during 2017 accounted for 4.8 million head (2). Internally, U.S.
pork production depends on the extensive movement of animals.
Of the approximately 171.4 million hogs and pigs marketed in
the United States in 2017, 55.2 million were shipped across state
lines for feeding or breeding purposes (3). With this being the
case, any factor that might restrict exports, imports, and state-
to-state shipments would have serious economic implications for
producers and the broader economy. Therefore, it is important
to identify, prior to an outbreak, potential procedures and plans
that may mitigate the consequences and maintain continuity
of business by reestablishing movements and trade as quickly
as possible.
During a FAD outbreak, as is the case with any other
disease, it is a producer’s responsibility to keep his/her animals
1For more information refer to the SPS Plan website at http://www.securepork.
org/.
from becoming infected. As such, while the responsibility for
preventing the introduction of a FAD into the United States is
primarily assigned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) and other
government agencies, producers are the first line of defense in
preparedness and are critical to response and recovery efforts.
Work on the SPS Plan by federal and state officials, industry, and
academia has created recommendations for enhanced biosecurity
practices that are designed to prevent the introduction and spread
of disease agents onto or off of a production site. The specific
practices are crafted based on knowledge about FMD, CSF, and
ASF, but they also help protect production sites from endemic
diseases (4).
As described by Levis and Baker (5), biosecurity is comprised
of bio-exclusion, bio-management, and bio-containment. Bio-
exclusion aims to prevent the introduction of a disease into a
herd or system, bio-management seeks to minimize the impact of
diseases that have already been introduced into a herd or system,
and bio-containment strives to prevent the spread of diseases
from one herd or system to another, thereby protecting the rest
of the supply chain (5). Even though bio-containment would be
the most vital of the three components in the event of a FAD
outbreak in the United States, this component often receives
the least amount of attention from producers (5). The SPS
Plan outlines enhanced biosecurity measures that, in addition to
reflecting bio-exclusion and bio-management, contribute directly
to bio-containment. Adoption of these recommended biosecurity
practices would be one component in positioning operations
(premises) with animals that have no evidence of infection during
the outbreak to move animals to processing or another pork
production premises under a movement permit and maintain
domestic markets.
The SPS Plan could also help maintain continuity of business
because it could be instrumental in compartmentalization
and regionalization efforts. According to FAO and OIE (6),
compartmentalization and regionalization (also known as
zoning) are two disease management strategies that seek,
through use of preventative biosecurity practices and separation
of animal populations, to distinguish animal populations with
differentiable health status. Whereas compartmentalization
deals primarily with management and biosecurity within
the establishments comprising the compartment, zoning
focuses more on natural or human-made barriers and
other geographic features (6). The disease-free status of
these compartments and zones could promote continuity
of business and prevent interruptions to, or reestablish,
international trade (7). Compartmentalization has not been
fully implemented by the United States for any disease agent
to date and will depend on the recognition of the status of
these compartments by international trading partners (6),
but zoning helped maintain safe trade in poultry and poultry
products during the highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak
in the United States in 2015 (8). The enhanced biosecurity
measures recommended in the SPS biosecurity guidelines
could contribute to compartmentalization (in particular) and
zoning as they could aid producers in providing assurances
to pertinent officials that they are not contributing to the
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spread of disease nor putting their own animals at risk
of exposure.
An operation’s ability to adopt, implement, and sustain a
biosecurity intervention or process such as the SPS Plan is
complex. As highlighted by Levis and Baker (5), the use of
biosecurity measures differs widely among operations for a
wide variety of reasons which include type of swine operation,
geographic location, and epidemiological situation, which refers
to causes, distribution, and control of diseases in the herd.
Moore et al. (9) suggest many potential causes for producers
deciding not to implement biosecurity recommendations, among
which are an unawareness about the potential risks both to
their operation and the entire industry, a miscalculation of
costs compared to benefits, and confusion regarding which
recommendations to adopt. Complicating the situation even
further is, as Hennessy [(10), p. 70] notes, “Prevention involves
making resource allocation choices about low probability risks
that may materialize in the indefinite future. People are
not particularly good at making such decisions, tending to
overemphasize some risks and place too much weight on the
recent past.”
Most data concerning producer decision making regarding
biosecurity adoption is often incomplete or lacks the requisite
depth for rigorous analysis. Lists of recommended biosecurity
practices have been created by various entities (9), but there
has been little research on adoption of these recommended
biosecurity practices by swine producers in the United States.
This makes intuitive sense given that, until the porcine
epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) outbreak in 2013-14, most pork
producers in the United States had not personally experienced
a large emerging animal disease outbreak on their operations
during their lifetimes, so adoption of biosecurity in U.S.
pork production historically has been primarily precautionary
and voluntary. This biosecurity paradigm is still generally in
place today, but the PEDV outbreak did heighten awareness
of new and improved biosecurity that proved beneficial
against PEDV and a host of other pathogens and likely
led to implementation of more complete and stringently
suggested biosecurity plans. Still, existing data are mainly
descriptive and lack the depth to fully understand producer
decision making.
The literature on biosecurity adoption by swine producers
in other countries is more comprehensive likely due to the
number and type of animal disease outbreaks and damages
incurred as well as both the existence of permit/assurance
bonding schemes where it is the owners’ responsibility to keep
their animals free of disease and livestock disease insurance
products available that offer reduced premiums for owners
practicing good biosecurity (11). In particular, many studies have
addressed livestock biosecurity adoptions in Europe, with recent
examples including Simon-Grifé et al. (12) in Spain, Sahlström
et al. (13) in Finland, and Postma et al. (14) in Belgium, France,
Germany, and Sweden. Some of these studies identify producer
and operation characteristics that influence adoption, but there
has been little research on such impacts in the United States.
Because SPS Plan enhanced biosecurity implementation
is precautionary and voluntary, producer perceptions and
characteristics of their operations are certainly important drivers
of adoption.
The goal of this analysis is to first identify producer
views on the feasibility of implementation of SPS Plan
enhanced biosecurity recommendations on their operation.
Of interest is whether feasibility (i.e., practicality of affordable
implementation) may help explain lower-than-expected
adoption of recommended biosecurity measures. Second,
this analysis seeks to determine what type of producers
(and operations) have implemented the SPS Plan enhanced
biosecurity guidelines. Knowledge of these characteristics
will help program administrators and educators better serve
current participants as well as identify the characteristics of
producers not currently participating and thus enable more
efficient resource allocation in efforts to expand participation.
Furthermore, since a biosecurity program is only as good as
its weakest point, there is a need to understand what specific
practices may increase adoption of other practices. Therefore,
we also examine the complementary nature of biosecurity
adoption. Altogether, this study provides the first comprehensive
analysis of producer participation in the SPS Plan and should
be critically valuable in future management of the SPS Plan and
related programs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Survey Instrument and Data
The survey procedures were approved by the Iowa State
University Office for Responsible Research, Institutional Review
Board. All methods for data collection and gathering were
performed in accordance with the relevant regulations and in
compliance with the received guidelines. Completion of the
questionnaire by survey participants constituted implied consent.
A questionnaire developed by researchers and extension
professionals and administered by the Iowa State University
Center for Survey Statistics and Methodology was used in
collecting information from swine producers in Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, andWisconsin.
The 13 states surveyed represent 50% of U.S. hog operations and
91% of the U.S. hog inventory (15).
The survey questions were programmed for online application
using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The
sampling frame used in selecting producers to survey was
developed from state pork producer association membership
lists. Survey data was collected using the online survey
mechanism from March 23 through June 1, 2017. Information
collected in the survey included producer and operation
demographic characteristics, responses to how feasible
implementation of SPS Plan biosecurity practices are on a
producer’s operation, and data detailing producers’ use of SPS
Plan biosecurity practices. Completed or partially completed
surveys from 371 producers were received. Table 1 reports
selected characteristics of the survey respondents. Further
details regarding the survey instrument and sample design, data
collection procedures, and a comprehensive summary of the data
are available in Pudenz et al. (16).
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics of survey respondents.
Variable Description N Mean Std. dev.
AGE Age of producer (in years) 276 53.366 12.107
COLLEGE = 1 if 4 year college degree or graduate degree; 0 otherwise 279 0.563 0.497
WHAT OPERATION TYPE BEST DESCRIBES YOUR HOG OPERATION?
FARROWFINISH = 1 if farrow to finish; 0 otherwise 371 0.299 0.459
BREEDING = 1 if breeding/farrowing or nursery; 0 otherwise 371 0.105 0.307
WEANFINISH = 1 if wean to finish; 0 otherwise 371 0.364 0.482
FINISH = 1 if finish; 0 otherwise 371 0.173 0.378
OTHEROPERATION = 1 if boar stud or gilt developer unit or other operation type; 0 otherwise 371 0.059 0.237
WHICH BUSINESS ARRANGEMENT BEST DESCRIBES THE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH YOU ARE PRESENTLY PRODUCING HOGS?
INDEPENDENT = 1 if independent producer; 0 otherwise 369 0.485 0.500
INTEGRATOR = 1 if contractor or integrator; 0 otherwise 369 0.106 0.308
CONTRACTGROWER = 1 if contract grower (contractee); 0 otherwise 369 0.360 0.481
OTHERBUSINESS = 1 if other business arrangement; 0 otherwise 369 0.049 0.216
IOWA = 1 if Iowa pork producer; 0 otherwise 371 0.604 0.490
PRODUCTIONSITES Number of separate productions sites (unique premise ID, unique address) in 2016 351 16.436 57.481
HIGHRATING = 1 if producer’s operation biosecurity is perceived to be higher than other operations in the area; 0 otherwise 336 0.830 0.376
REPORTABLE = 1 if a producer’s operation has experienced PRRSV and/or PEDV in the past 3 years; 0 otherwise 354 0.684 0.466
HOW MANY TIMES IN THE NEXT 100 YEARS DO YOU THINK A TIER 1 DISEASE OUTBREAK WILL OCCUR IN THE U.S. SWINE INDUSTRY?
NOOUTBREAKS = 1 if no outbreaks expected; 0 otherwise 298 0.091 0.288
ONEOUTBREAK = 1 if one outbreak expected; 0 otherwise 298 0.235 0.425
TWOOUTBREAKS = 1 if two or more outbreaks expected; 0 otherwise 298 0.674 0.469
Feasibility and Implementation Cross
Tabulation Analysis
The SPS Plan emphasizes biosecurity concepts that all pork
production sites must implement to help protect their animals
from endemic diseases and to be prepared in the event of an
FAD outbreak in the United States. These include a written site-
specific plan, perimeter buffer area (PBA), and line of separation
(LOS) 2,3.
A self-assessment checklist for meeting PBA and LOS
biosecurity performance standards was presented to each
survey participant. Figure 1 provides examples of these survey
questions, and the full list of PBA and LOS practices are
displayed in Table 2. The survey contained Likert scale responses
on a scale of 1 to 5 for feasibility of implementation, with 1
labeled as highly infeasible, 2 as infeasible, 3 as neutral, 4 as
feasible, and 5 as highly feasible. These numerical responses
2These three concepts were outlined in “SPS Plan Update 2013, DRAFT SPS
Plan: Appendix A Producer Biosecurity.” The 2013 draft expounds on these
recommendations, highlighting the importance of a PBA and a LOS (particularly)
and listing various components of each. As such, the PBA and LOS are the focus
of the feasibility analysis. Since 2013, the SPS Plan has gone through various
updates, with the current iteration of the SPS Plan highlighting four biosecurity
recommendations: the previously-mentioned three items, as well as the explicit
recommendation for a designated Biosecurity Manager (4).
3The SPS Plan defines a perimeter buffer area (PBA) as an outer control boundary
around swine buildings designed to restrict disease transmission near such
buildings and a line of separation (LOS) as a control boundary to restrict disease
transmission into areas where hogs can be exposed (4). In practice, a PBA is often
a fence or other physical barrier with defined access points around swine buildings
while a LOS is often the walls of the buildings themselves (4). See Secure Pork
Supply [(4), pg. 5] for an illustrative diagram of a PBA and a LOS.
were converted into categorical variables. Responses 1 and 2
were combined and converted into one infeasible label, 4 and
5 (feasible) were combined, and response 3 was not combined
with other responses in order to more directly compare infeasible
and feasible responses. Respondents who chose response 3, the
neutral choice, might have been those who did not know or
have definitive opinions about the feasibility of implementation
(17). For questions regarding implementation on a producer’s
operation, responses were coded as binary variables equal
to one if used on an operation and zero otherwise. Cross-
tabulations were used to examine relationships between how
feasible producers believe implementation is on their operation
and if PBA and LOS practices are used on their operation.
Binomial Logit Regression Analysis
Binomial logit regression analysis was used to determine the
types of producers and operations most likely to adopt each
of the following biosecurity practices: a written site-specific
plan, PBA, and LOS. Two models were estimated to determine
factors affecting development and implementation of a written
site-specific plan, one for a plan for employees and one for
a plan for delivery/service personnel. Separate models were
estimated for each PBA practice (four total) and for each LOS
practice (10 total), resulting in a binomial logit regression
being estimated for each biosecurity practice. Descriptions
and summary statistics for all 16 dependent variables (i.e.,
the aforementioned biosecurity practices) are provided in
Table 2. Explanatory variables derived from the survey data are
categorized as producer characteristics, operation characteristics,
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FIGURE 1 | Example perimeter buffer area and line of separation questions from a 2017 survey of U.S. swine producers.
and risk attitudes. See Table 1 for descriptions and summary
statistics of the explanatory variables.
Several of the explanatory variables require more explanation.
Specifically, one novel contribution of this study is inclusion of
an operation’s past experience with any of the most common
prevalent swine diseases. Of the five disease options included
in the survey, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
(PRRS), and porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) were
the two diseases appearing on the U.S. National List of
Reportable Animal Diseases for 2017 (18). Therefore, to control
for past disease experiences, we include REPORTABLE as a
binary explanatory variable that equals one if the producer had
experienced a PRRS and/or PEDV outbreak on their operation in
the last 3 years and zero otherwise.
Explaining producers’ behavior in risky situations requires
characterizations of risk attitudes. Exploratory factor analysis was
conducted on responses to five Likert scale questions from the
survey to assess swine producers’ attitudes toward risk, especially
in regards to how they manage their business financially. These
questions included: (a) When marketing my hogs, I prefer
financial certainty to financial uncertainty; (b) With respect to
the conduct of my business, I prefer certainty to uncertainty; (c) I
like “playing it safe”; (d) I am willing to take higher financial risks
in order to realize higher average returns; and, (e) I like taking
financial risks. The factor analysis (a principal factor analysis with
a promax rotation) resulted in two factors that together explained
more than 70% of the variation in the responses to the five Likert
scale questions. The first factor was named RISKAVERSE due
to high loadings on the first three questions, while the second
factor was named RISKACCEPTING due to high loadings on
the last two questions. In other words, the RISKAVERSE factor
makes a meaningful contribution to the variation in responses
to questions about risk aversion, while the RISKACCEPTING
factor contributes meaningfully to the variation in responses to
questions about risk acceptance. Scores for each factor, which are
the sums of optimally weighted scores on the five questions (19),
were estimated for each producer and included in each of the
models as explanatory variables.
To account for expectations based on future disease events,
a prospective risk attitude explanatory variable describes the
number of times in the next 100 years that producers think a Tier
1 disease outbreak will occur in the U.S. swine industry. For this
variable, responses were categorized into no outbreaks expected
(NOOUTBREAKS), one outbreak expected (ONEOUTBREAK),
and two or more outbreaks expected (MUTIPLEOUTBREAKS).
This equates to a 0, 1, or 2% or more, respectively, perceived
probability of a Tier 1 disease outbreak.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Feasibility of Biosecurity Implementation
Table 2 shows the percentage of producers responding to
the survey that implemented each of the four PBA and ten
LOS practices. Interestingly, PBA practice implementation was
relatively low. Nearly 60% of producers verify all animal transport
vehicles being clean, disinfected, and dried before entry to the
site, but the remaining practices had mean adoption rates of
less than 40%. Adoption of LOS practices was generally higher,
however, with two practices having adoption rates above 90%.
Beliefs regarding how feasible implementation of each
biosecurity practice is on his/her operation likely influences
a producer’s motivation to implement, as some measures
could be perceived impractical or impossible (20–22).
Relationships between feasibility ratings and biosecurity practice
implementation were investigated using cross-tabulations
(Table 2). The values in each of the cells in the table represent the
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TABLE 2 | Cross-tabulations of PBA and LOS implementation and feasibility of implementation.
Mean Implementation by feasibility rating
Practice Description N Implementation Infeasible Neutral Feasible
PERIMETER BUFFER AREA (PBA)
PBADEFINED A perimeter buffer area is clearly defined 317 0.391 (0.489) 0.161 (0.371)a 0.185 (0.391)a 0.569 (0.497)b
PBAENTRY Access to perimeter buffer area is restricted through a single entry
with a gate at the entrance which is locked when the facility is not
attended
317 0.177 (0.382) 0.082 (0.276)a 0.117 (0.323)a 0.340 (0.476)b
PBAEQUIPMENT All vehicles and equipment (not containing animals) entering the
perimeter buffer area are documented to be clean, disinfected,
and dried
315 0.229 (0.421) 0.066 (0.249)a 0.105 (0.309)a 0.479 (0.502)b
PBATRANSPORT All animal transport vehicles are verified clean, disinfected, and
dried before entry to the site
315 0.571 (0.496) 0.239 (0.430)a 0.233 (0.427)a 0.761 (0.427)b
LINE OF SEPARATION (LOS)
LOSDEFINED A line of separation is clearly defined for each building 309 0.605 (0.490) 0.327 (0.474)a 0.180 (0.388)b 0.778 (0.417)c
LOSLOCKED Buildings are locked when no one is present 308 0.425 (0.495) 0.123 (0.331)a 0.064 (0.247)a 0.612 (0.488)b
LOSENTRY One entry point has been established for personnel to cross the
line of separation
308 0.688 (0.464) 0.235 (0.428)a 0.231 (0.427)a 0.876 (0.330)b
LOSANIMALS All animals, including birds, are excluded from crossing the line of
separation and contacting pigs
308 0.731 (0.444) 0.233 (0.427)a 0.409 (0.503)b 0.894 (0.309)c
LOSLOG A visitor logbook is maintained by the site manager/owner 309 0.495 (0.501) 0.314 (0.471)a 0.125 (0.334)b 0.619 (0.487)c
LOSCLOTHING Employees and visitors are instructed to change into site-specific
coveralls or clothing and boots and wash hands when crossing to
the pig side of the line of separation
309 0.770 (0.421) 0.361 (0.487)a 0.458 (0.509)a 0.859 (0.348)b
LOSCLOTHESPBA When a site includes multiple pig buildings, site-specific clothing or
coveralls and boots are put on within the perimeter buffer area and
boots changed at each barn when crossing the line of separation
296 0.534 (0.500) 0.154 (0.364)a 0.190 (0.397)a 0.741 (0.439)b
LOSFOMITES All equipment and other objects (including cell phones, jewelry,
and electronics) that cross to the pig side of the line of separation
are cleaned and disinfected, or come from a known clean source
303 0.419 (0.494) 0.137 (0.346)a 0.109 (0.315)a 0.663 (0.474)b
LOSCLEANING Cleaning and disinfecting of animal rooms and buildings between
groups of pigs is required
304 0.905 (0.294) 0.632 (0.496)a 0.313 (0.479)b 0.959 (0.198)c
LOSFEED Feed is delivered and stored in bird, rodent, and insect proof
containers/bins and feed spills are cleaned up
304 0.901 (0.299) 0.636 (0.492)a 0.467 (0.516)a 0.948 (0.223)b
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
a,b,cValues within the same row with unique superscripts differ P < 0.10 according to Wilcoxon rank sum tests.
percentage of those in the corresponding feasibility categorical
group that have implemented the biosecurity practice. Not
surprisingly, producers who believed implementation of a
biosecurity practice was infeasible on their operation had lower
implementation of that practice than producers who believed
implementation was feasible.
For most practices, no statistically significant differences
in implementation were detected between producers who
believed implementation of a biosecurity practice was infeasible
on their operation compared to those who were neutral
about the feasibility of implementation. A few exceptions
were found for LOS practices. For example, producers who
were neutral about the feasibility of a line of separation
being clearly defined for each building had a lower level
of implementation of this practice than those who believed
the practice was infeasible. Conversely, producers who
were neutral about the feasibility of excluding all animals,
including birds, from crossing the line of separation and
contacting pigs had a higher level of implementation
than those who believed the practice was infeasible. As
previously indicated, a neutral response may indicate
not knowing or having a definitive opinion about the
feasibility of implementation, which may indicate a lack of
knowledge of costs of implementation more generally. For
example, fixed costs of biosecurity implementation are often
relatively straight forward, but variable costs can be highly
variable especially with respect to time (opportunity cost)
and labor.
Comparing the relative implementation levels across
feasibility ratings reveals several interesting patterns. Some
producers are choosing not to implement certain biosecurity
practices even though they consider the practices to be feasible
to implement on their operation. On the other hand, some
producers are choosing to implement biosecurity regardless
of whether they deem the practice feasible to implement. This
suggests that adoption of biosecurity measures on operations
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depends not only on feasibility of implementation, but on other
motivations such as socio-economic factors.
Determinants of Biosecurity
Implementation
To examine the socio-economic factors related to adoption of
SPS Plan biosecurity recommendations, we used binomial logit
regressions. We focus on the marginal effects (Tables 3, 4) to
show statistical significance of results and for interpretations
of variables, where marginal effects were calculated as in
Greene [(23), p. 734] for continuous variables and Greene
[(23), p. 735] for binary variables. The marginal effects indicate
the percentage change in probability either at the mean for
continuous explanatory variables or for the “1” value for binary
explanatory variables. Thus, one should interpret a positive effect
as meaning that an increase in that explanatory variable has a
positive impact on the probability of adopting the biosecurity
practice in question.
Although themarginal effects varied, several patterns emerged
across the 16 estimated logit regressions. The signs on the
marginal effects vary across biosecurity practices, but where the
marginal effects were statistically significant, respondents were
more likely to adopt certain practices as age increased. The
effect of producer age on biosecurity adoption has provided
mixed results in previous related research concerning adoption
of other types of practices (24, 25). Older, more experienced
swine producers may be expected to recognize the advantages of
biosecurity practices, and thus to implement them. At the same
time, those who have been in the business longer may be slower
to adopt newer biosecurity practices.
Previous research has found that higher education results
in greater adoption of technologies, management practices, and
production systems (25, 26). However, we find that producers
who hold a 4 year college degree were 14.2% less likely to
maintain a visitor log book and 7.8% less likely to insure that
feed is delivered and stored in bird, rodent, and insect proof
containers/bins and feed spills are cleaned up. Although signs on
the marginal effects for some other biosecurity practices suggest
greater use by college-educated producers, these marginal effects
are not statistically significant.
Operation type had a large influence on biosecurity adoption.
When compared to farrow to finish operations, finishing
operations were 18.8% more likely to always provide site-
specific biosecurity procedures to employees and 19.0% more
likely to always provide site-specific biosecurity procedures
to delivery/service personnel. These results are somewhat
unexpected given the health pyramid concept (27), which seeks
to minimize the downstream effects of disease by controlling
for disease toward the top of the pyramid and thus prioritizes
the health of animals in the genetic nucleus and multiplication
population, followed by farrowing and gestation, nursery,
and lastly finishing animals. On the other hand, farrow to
finish operations likely have fewer live animal inputs and
retain some attributes of a closed herd which minimizes
disease entry and introduction and could conceivably lessen
the biosecurity needed. The results concerning breeding (i.e.,
breeding/farrowing or nursery) operations, however, reflect the
health pyramid concept more closely, with breeding operations
being more likely to adopt many LOS practices compared to
farrow to finish operations. For example, breeding operations
were 19.7% more likely to have a defined LOS than farrow to
finish operations.
Business arrangement also had a large impact on adoption
of biosecurity practices. For example, compared to independent
producers, contract growers were more likely to always provide
site-specific biosecurity procedures to employees (25.1%) and
delivery/service personnel (23.2%). This makes sense considering
that the U.S. swine industry is increasingly defined by contracts
with growers to manage hogs provided and owned by a
contractor. Production contracts typically spell out not only the
length of a contract, terms for its renewal, and circumstances
that would result in termination, but also specific provisions
regarding which party is responsible for inputs like equipment,
facilities, feeder pigs, feed, and other terms such as biosecurity
policies. As such, the level of biosecurity might be institutionally
fixed through production contract agreements.
More production sites as part of an operation was found
to have a small but positive impact on biosecurity adoption
suggesting the presence of economies of size. For instance, for
every 10 additional production sites, a producer was about 0.7%
more likely to always provide site-specific biosecurity procedures
to employees and to delivery/service personnel and 0.9% more
likely to have a defined LOS. This is consistent with Hennessy
(28), Bottoms et al. (29), Nöremark et al. (30), and other
studies that find larger operations are more likely to adopt
biosecurity measures.
The Iowa variable, which represents geographical and pig
density differences from other states, was generally found to
decrease adoption rates 4. This seemingly contradicts the results
of Bottoms et al. (29), who found that high herd density generally
corresponded to higher biosecurity for sow herds in Ontario,
Canada. Iowa is the most intensely populated hog production
and pork processing state in the U.S. Geographical location of an
operation and pig density in the area are two significant factors
in the epidemiology of several diseases but, in general, producers
do not have much control over them. In high pig density areas, it
can be very difficult or impractical to maintain disease freedom
from common endemic diseases. This is no excuse for lower
biosecurity, but an appreciation of what is realistically achievable
is essential and likely leads to mixed results when it comes to
biosecurity implementation in high pig density regions.
Incidence of a reportable disease on an operation and
high biosecurity self-rating were generally found to encourage
biosecurity adoption. For example, compared to producers who
4A custom link survey was utilized in Iowa. In an effort to increase survey response,
expand distribution to include swine producers from other states, and respective
state associations’ reticence concerning access to members an open link survey was
utilized for swine producers outside of Iowa. As such, we were only able to identify
Iowa operations with certainty with producers outside of Iowa not reporting which
states(s) their production sites are located in or reporting multiple states. While
the Iowa variable does allow us to roughly identify how the use of biosecurity
measures differ across geographic location, future research should further explore
geographical differences with the inclusion of additional states or regions.
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TABLE 3 | Adoption of written site-specific biosecurity plan and perimeter buffer area practices: marginal effects (SE).
Variable PLAN
EMPLOYEES
PLAN
PERSONNEL
PBA
DEFINED
PBA
ENTRY
PBA
EQUIPMENT
PBA
TRANSPORT
AGE (1 1 year) −0.001 (0.002) −0.001 (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) −0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002)
COLLEGE 0.010 (0.053) −0.038 (0.053) 0.027 (0.055) 0.014 (0.042) −0.034 (0.051) 0.055 (0.058)
BREEDING (vs. FARROWFINISH) 0.064 (0.106) 0.085 (0.105) −0.019 (0.107) 0.110 (0.097) 0.025 (0.098) 0.053 (0.120)
WEANFINISH (vs. FARROWFINISH) 0.046 (0.068) −0.021 (0.076) −0.163** (0.075) −0.030 (0.063) −0.130* (0.067) −0.110 (0.077)
FINISH (vs. FARROWFINISH) 0.188** (0.090) 0.190* (0.106) −0.040 (0.101) −0.008 (0.081) −0.033 (0.090) −0.077 (0.111)
OTHEROPERATION (vs. FARROWFINISH) −0.032 (0.136) 0.144 (0.139) 0.016 (0.139) 0.185 (0.130) 0.091 (0.139) 0.069 (0.150)
INTEGRATOR (vs. INDEPENDENT) 0.165 (0.105) 0.232** (0.110) 0.253** (0.118) 0.066 (0.084) 0.184 (0.123) 0.149 (0.118)
CONTRACTGROWER (vs. INDEPENDENT) 0.251*** (0.066) 0.232*** (0.068) 0.170** (0.075) 0.091 (0.060) 0.067 (0.072) 0.044 (0.073)
OTHERBUSINESS (vs. INDEPENDENT) 0.202** (0.103) 0.287** (0.116) 0.151 (0.130) 0.066 (0.103) 0.210 (0.139) 0.247** (0.117)
IOWA −0.088 (0.063) −0.038 (0.061) −0.227*** (0.068) −0.204*** (0.050) −0.158*** (0.061) −0.123* (0.067)
ln(PRODUCTIONSITES) 0.065** (0.027) 0.069*** (0.024) −0.003 (0.026) −0.013 (0.018) −0.030 (0.024) 0.041 (0.028)
HIGHRATING 0.239*** (0.078) 0.321*** (0.062) 0.106 (0.075) 0.106** (0.049) 0.165*** (0.055) 0.203** (0.080)
REPORTABLE 0.002 (0.061) −0.012 (0.061) 0.045 (0.062) 0.010 (0.045) 0.065 (0.054) −0.018 (0.066)
RISKAVERSE 0.051* (0.029) 0.034 (0.030) 0.058* (0.032) 0.079*** (0.026) −0.010 (0.028) 0.025 (0.032)
RISKACCEPTING 0.033 (0.028) −0.046* (0.028) 0.014 (0.030) 0.055** (0.023) 0.019 (0.027) 0.059* (0.031)
ONEOUTBREAK (vs. NOOUTBREAKS) −0.115 (0.118) −0.056 (0.103) 0.162 (0.118) −0.048 (0.071) 0.107 (0.118) −0.088 (0.120)
TWOOUTBREAKS (vs. NOOUTBREAKS) −0.174* (0.104) −0.038 (0.101) 0.130 (0.093) 0.018 (0.070) 0.092 (0.088) −0.077 (0.109)
N 263 262 263 262 262 262
Pseudo (McFadden’s) R2 0.216 0.232 0.159 0.279 0.138 0.123
Predicted adoption rate 0.673 0.344 0.335 0.115 0.107 0.660
Actual adoption rate 0.605 0.385 0.395 0.176 0.240 0.580
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at p < 0.10, < 0.05, < 0.01, respectively.
did not experience PRRS and/or PEDV in the last 3 years,
producers who had experienced at least one of these diseases
were 11.0% more likely to instruct employees and visitors to
change into site-specific coveralls or clothing and boots and
wash hands when crossing to the pig side of the LOS and 11.7%
more likely to have feed delivered and store in bird, rodent,
and insect proof containers/bins and have feed spills cleaned up.
This is consistent with statements made by Schulz and Tonsor
(31) who suggest that the 2013-14U.S. PEDV outbreak could
have had the positive externality of encouraging biosecurity
implementation. As expected, producers having rated their own
biosecurity as high compared to their neighbors were more likely
to adopt several of the recommended biosecurity measures. Of
note, producers with a high biosecurity self-rating were 32.1%
more likely to always provide site-specific biosecurity procedures
to delivery/service personnel.
Risk attitudes were found to be significant determinants of
biosecurity adoption. Results indicate that risk-averse producers,
as determined via their responses to risk eliciting questions, were
more likely to adopt the recommended biosecurity practices.
Similarly, a risk-accepting attitude was positively correlated
with adoption, the one exception being risk-accepting producers
were 4.6% less likely to provide written site-specific biosecurity
procedures for all delivery/service personnel. In general, these
results suggest that regardless of how risky producers are in
how they manage their business financially, they understand the
importance of biosecurity measures needed on their operations
and adopt accordingly.
Some producers may be more willing than others to adopt
enhanced biosecurity practices because of the perceived risk of
a high-consequence foreign animal diseases occurring. When
compared to no expected outbreaks occurring, expecting one
outbreak to occur did not statistically significantly impact
biosecurity adoption. Producers who expected two or more
outbreaks to occur, however, were less likely to adopt two of the
recommended biosecurity practices. This latter result suggests
a rather pessimistic view of high-consequence foreign animal
diseases occurring in the United States could be a deterrent to
biosecurity adoption for some producers and for some particular
biosecurity practices.
As Mankad (32) highlights, there is a need to incorporate
psychological, social and cognitive factors on decision making
related to biosecurity and management practices. Our results
emphasize the important role of risk attitudes and perceptions in
explaining biosecurity adoption behavior which is valuable since
studies of the factors leading to the adoption of technology and
management practices by producers all too often focus only on
the explanatory role of typical producer demographics.
The last two rows of Tables 3, 4 report “predicted adoption
rate,” and “actual adoption rate,” which are useful in evaluating
the capability of these models to predict biosecurity adoption.
The “predicted adoption rate” is the proportion of producers
that each binomial logit regression predicted would adopt a
particular biosecurity practice, while “actual adoption rate” is the
proportion of producers who adopted that practice as recorded
in the survey responses. As these statistics demonstrate, the
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models reasonably predicted the adoption rate in most cases.
In particular, 60.5% of producers always provide site-specific
biosecurity procedures to employees, and the model predicted
67.3% of producers would adopt this practice. Results such
as these lend credence to the logit procedure used in this
analysis. That said, not all of the 16 models performed this
well. Additionally, some variables are statistically significant in
some models but not in others when we might expect the
impact of a variable on adoption to be similar for some (or
even most) practices. The results from the logit regressions (and
the previously discussed feasibility analysis) indicate that socio-
economic factors (producer and operation demographics and
producer attitudes and perceptions) play a significant role in
biosecurity adoption, but still other factors could be drivers
of adoption.
Complementarity of Biosecurity Practices
Thus far, adoption of biosecurity practices have been considered
independently. The complementary nature of adoption of
the enhanced biosecurity practices could be evaluated to
reveal how adoption of one practice influences adoption of
another practice. An analysis of complementarity was completed
utilizing conditional probabilities (33, 34), with complementarity
of adoption being demonstrated by following Chihara and
Hesterberg (35) to show statistically significant differences
between adoption rates of one practice for adopters and non-
adopters of a second practice. Results are reported in Tables 5–7.
Consider the following two LOS practices—clearly defining
a LOS for each building (LOSDEFINED), and having one
established entry point for personnel to cross the line of
separation (LOSENTRY). Intuitively, having a clearly defined
LOS is basically required for having one entry point for
crossing, so one could reasonably expect that adoption of one
of these practices impacts the adoption of the other. The data
corroborates this prediction. As shown in Table 7, of the subset
of producers who reported having a defined LOS, 91.1% reported
TABLE 5 | Adoption rates of providing a written site-specific biosecurity plan, a
defined perimeter buffer area, and a defined line of separation (in italics) given
non-adoption or adoption of the other practices (in bold).
Non-Adoption (%) Adoption (%)
PLANPROVIDED*
PBADEFINED 26.5 63.3
LOSDEFINED 52.0 75.0
PBADEFINED
PLANPROVIDED* 22.7 58.5
LOSDEFINED 49.2 77.6
LOSDEFINED
PLANPROVIDED* 23.2 45.5
PBADEFINED 22.2 50.5
*Adoption of PLANPROVIDED means that a producer always provides site-specific
procedures to all employees and to all deliver/service personnel. Of the 337 respondents,
37.09% adopted PLANPROVIDED.
All differences (rate given adoption – rate given non-adoption) statistically significant at
p ≤ 0.01.
also having one entry point for crossing. Compare this to the
subset of producers who reported not having a defined LOS, of
which only 33.6% reported having one entry point for crossing.
As expected, adoption of these two biosecurity practices goes
hand in hand, and this result is not unique. Consider two
other practices for which adoption could be expected to be
related—vehicles and equipment entering the PBA are verified
to be clean, disinfected, and dried before entry to the site
(PBAEQUIPMENT), and transport vehicles entering the PBA
are verified to be clean, disinfected, and dried before entry to
the site (PBATRANSPORT). As Table 6 shows, the conditional
probability of verifying that vehicles and equipment entering the
PBA are clean, disinfected, and dried given that all transport
vehicles entering the PBA are verified to be clean, disinfected,
and dried is six times higher (36.8 vs. 5.8%) than the conditional
probability of verifying that vehicles and equipment entering the
PBA are clean, disinfected, and dried given that the practice of
verifying that all transport vehicles entering the PBA are clean,
disinfected and dried has not been adopted. Once again, adoption
of one of these practices clearly impacts the adoption of the other.
High degrees of complementarity are more or less universal
across all practices, even for practices that are not as obviously
related as the pairs of practices detailed in the previous paragraph.
Consider this time the practices of always providing site-specific
biosecurity procedures to both employees and delivery/service
personnel (PLANPROVIDED) and of clearly defining a PBA
(PBADEFINED). Even though there is no evident relationship
between the two practices, the subset of producers who always
provide site-specific biosecurity procedures has a 63.3% adoption
rate for clearly defining a PBA, while the subset of producers who
do not always provide site-specific biosecurity procedures has a
much lower adoption rate of 26.5% for defining a PBA (Table 5).
TABLE 6 | Adoption rates of perimeter buffer area practices (in italics) given
non-adoption or adoption of the other perimeter buffer area practices (in bold).
Non-Adoption (%) Adoption (%)
PBADEFINED
PBAENTRY 7.7 32.3
PBAEQUIPMENT 11.3 41.5
PBATRANSPORT 43.6 78.3
PBAENTRY
PBADEFINED 32.8 73.7
PBAEQUIPMENT 16.8 55.4
PBATRANSPORT 53.0 78.6
PBAEQUIPMENT
PBADEFINED 30.6 71.1
PBAENTRY 10.1 40.8
PBATRANSPORT 47.4 89.5
PBATRANSPORT
PBADEFINED 20.3 54.3
PBAENTRY 8.7 23.7
PBAEQUIPMENT 5.8 36.8
All differences (rate given adoption – rate given non-adoption) statistically significant at
p ≤0.01.
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TABLE 7 | Adoption rates of line of separation practices (in italics) given
non-adoption or adoption of the other line of separation practices (in bold).
Non-adoption (%) Adoption (%)
LOSCLEANING
LOSDEFINED 17.2 65.0
LOSLOCKED 10.3 45.9
LOSENTRY 20.7 73.4
LOSANIMALS 17.2 79.1
LOSLOG 10.3 53.4
LOSCLOTHING 24.1 82.7
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 14.3 56.9
LOSFOMITES 10.3 44.7
LOSFEED 51.7 94.0
LOSDEFINED
LOSLOCKED 18.3 57.8
LOSENTRY 33.6 91.1
LOSANIMALS 48.8 89.1
LOSLOG 27.0 63.5
LOSCLOTHING 53.2 92.2
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 28.9 68.9
LOSFOMITES 12.3 60.3
LOSCLEANING 80.5 97.4
LOSFEED 79.7 96.8
LOSENTRY
LOSDEFINED 17.0 80.6
LOSLOCKED 13.0 55.0
LOSANIMALS 36.4 89.9
LOSLOG 25.0 60.4
LOSCLOTHING 49.0 89.4
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 25.0 65.9
LOSFOMITES 13.3 54.5
LOSCLEANING 76.5 97.2
LOSFEED 74.5 97.2
LOSANIMALS
LOSDEFINED 24.7 73.7
LOSLOCKED 16.5 51.7
LOSENTRY 25.9 84.4
LOSLOG 22.4 58.6
LOSCLOTHING 42.4 89.2
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 20.3 64.7
LOSFOMITES 15.7 50.7
LOSCLEANING 71.1 97.8
LOSFEED 69.9 97.4
LOSCLOTHING
LOSDEFINED 20.3 72.5
LOSLOCKED 13.5 50.8
LOSENTRY 31.1 79.8
LOSANIMALS 33.8 85.2
LOSLOG 8.1 61.5
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 23.2 61.7
LOSFOMITES 11.3 50.4
LOSCLEANING 69.0 97.1
LOSFEED 73.2 95.0
(Continued)
TABLE 7 | Continued
Non-adoption (%) Adoption (%)
LOSFEED
LOSDEFINED 19.4 65.1
LOSLOCKED 12.9 45.9
LOSENTRY 19.4 73.9
LOSANIMALS 19.4 79.3
LOSLOG 9.7 53.7
LOSCLOTHING 38.7 81.5
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 16.1 57.1
LOSFOMITES 12.9 44.6
LOSCLEANING 54.8 94.7
LOSFOMITES
LOSDEFINED 41.2 88.4
LOSLOCKED 30.2 59.7
LOSENTRY 53.3 89.9
LOSANIMALS 61.5 89.8
LOSLOG 29.7 77.5
LOSCLOTHING 65.4 93.8
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 37.4 75.2
LOSCLEANING 85.7 97.7
LOSFEED 85.2 96.9
LOSCLOTHINGPBA
LOSDEFINED 39.9 78.3
LOSLOCKED 32.2 51.6
LOSENTRY 49.7 85.1
LOSANIMALS 55.6 90.1
LOSLOG 35.0 62.7
LOSCLOTHING 62.9 90.1
LOSFOMITES 21.7 58.4
LOSCLEANING 83.2 97.5
LOSFEED 81.8 96.9
LOSLOG
LOSDEFINED 43.2 78.2
LOSLOCKED 30.9 53.8
LOSENTRY 53.4 84.0
LOSANIMALS 59.3 87.7
LOSCLOTHING 58.0 96.2
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 39.2 66.9
LOSFOMITES 18.5 64.9
LOSCLEANING 83.5 98.1
LOSFEED 82.3 98.1
LOSLOCKED
LOSDEFINED 44.0 82.8
LOSENTRY 53.0 90.2
LOSANIMALS 61.2 89.6
LOSLOG 39.1 62.7
LOSCLOTHING 65.2 92.5
LOSCLOTHINGPBA 44.6 64.3
LOSFOMITES 29.1 58.3
LOSCLEANING 85.5 97.7
LOSFEED 84.9 97.0
All differences (rate given adoption – rate given non-adoption) statistically significant at
p ≤ 0.01.
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It is possible that complementarity occurs because the use of
one practice increases the marginal efficacy of another practice.
However, as Pruitt et al. (33) indicate, it could also be because
some people are simply “adopters” of practices. In either case,
the complementarity results show that adoption of specific
biosecurity practices often go hand in hand.
CONCLUSION
Given that biosecurity adoption in the past in the United States
has largely been precautionary and voluntary, this study provides
key insights into the very complex and ever-changing issue
of biosecurity adoption. Producer attitudes about feasibility of
implementation, producer and operation demographics, risk
attitudes and perceptions, and complementarity of practices
were all shown to play a meaningful role in whether or
not a producer adopted recommended SPS Plan biosecurity
practices. As was demonstrated, not one of these factors
provides the entire picture by itself and there are many factors
at play when producers weigh biosecurity adoption. Further
complicating the situation is that biosecurity adoption is not
static. In fact, producer attitudes and adoption rates may
have meaningfully changed since the data for this study was
collected, especially in response to the recent outbreaks of ASF
in China.
Keeping these complexities in mind is of utmost importance,
especially at a time when, for better or for worse, the
precautionary and voluntary biosecurity paradigm in the
United States appears to be shifting. For example, governing
bodies in the United States have not historically mandated
(either directly or indirectly) biosecurity adoption in response
to concerns with antimicrobial resistance the same way their
European counterparts have [see European Commission, (36)].
In recent years, however, policies such as the Veterinary Feed
Directive—which has been shown by Schulz and Rademacher
(37) to cause producers to modify biosecurity—are being
considered and implemented by U.S. governing bodies. As
another example, during the 2014–2015 Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza outbreak in the U.S., indemnity payments to
producers were made conditionally on producers providing
evidence that they were using biosecurity meant to prevent
the spread of the disease when it was discovered in their
flocks (38). Given the complicated nature of this issue,
this study could provide educators and policy makers
with vital information as they think about such policies
going forward.
The complexity of this issue also means there are plenty
of opportunities for further research. In our survey, producers
indicated if they used the recommended biosecurity practices
on their operation. Future surveys should consider framing of
the question with respect to peacetime (i.e., a normal operating
environment) and during an animal health emergency (i.e.,
acute animal health crisis actively impacting interstate and
international trade). That is, instead of presenting binary options
“being used” or “not being used,” perhaps producers could be
asked to select from “being used,” “not currently being used
but could be if needed,” or “not feasible to implement.” This
approach would help, in part, determine producers’ evaluations
of industry-wide costs of not adopting biosecurity. Livestock
operations obviously have a strong interest in remaining disease-
free for a variety of reasons, but operations may not take
into account how their actions affect other operations. If a
producer is shown to always use a practice, it may be that
the producer has a better understanding (or higher valuation)
of industry-wide costs of a disease outbreak compared to a
producer who only implements biosecurity during an outbreak.
Knowing how many producers undervalue industry-wide costs
of an outbreak would be very helpful to program administrators
and educators.
Future work should also consider collecting information
on farm-level costs of biosecurity implementation as this may
help to better explain adoption than, more generally, self-
assessments of the perceived feasibility of adoption on an
operation. For example, biosecurity investments entail a mixture
of fixed and variable costs. By knowing farm-level fixed and
variable cost estimates, economic tradeoffs could be considered
and the relative influence of each for biosecurity adoption
identified. Furthermore, knowing costs would help inform cost-
sharing schemes related to animal disease mitigation efforts,
where biosecurity is intended to be a factor in the cost-
sharing strategies.
The logit and complementarity analyses conducted here,
although robust, have limitations. In particular, while the
complementarity analysis definitely demonstrates that adoption
of practices go together, one has to be careful when drawing
conclusions about causality when only considering conditional
probabilities. Multinomial or multivariate logit models could
be used instead of binomial logit models and conditional
probabilities, but as Pruitt et al. (33) also found, such analysis
is made difficult by the sheer number (in this case, 16) of
recommended practices. Also of note is that this analysis is
agnostic about the relative importance of different practices.
For example, clearly defining a LOS for each building may
or may not be more important for overall biosecurity than
maintaining a visitor logbook, but the analysis in this study
makes no value judgment. Making an assumption about the
relative importance of practices could allow for further analysis
to proceed. By weighting each practice the same for overall
operation biosecurity, one could conduct a count data regression
analysis as in Gale (39) to look for jointness in adoption.
Alternatively, a weighting system could be applied such as
in Postma et al. (14) to give an overall biosecurity rating to
each producer before performing subsequent analysis. Future
research avenues such as these could enhance and extend the
results in this study, providing additional valuable insights about
biosecurity adoption.
Future producer and industry leader education efforts may
be more targeted by incorporating findings from this study.
These refined efforts may lead to a clearer understanding
by producers of biosecurity’s many decisions and ultimately
improved decision-making regarding biosecurity adoption and
compliance efforts. Similarly, future efforts to develop new
technologies, programs, or protocols to enhance individual
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2019 | Volume 6 | Article 146
Pudenz et al. Swine Producer Biosecurity Adoption
firm and industry-wide biosecurity should heed these results.
Development or marketing of biosecurity options that producers
are unlikely to widely implement is a missed opportunity, while
alternatively focusing efforts on options more likely to be utilized
is an improved possibility if the results from this study are
properly leveraged.
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